Employing an EVA style classification, we examine whether active investors (such as hedge funds and other long-short investors) can develop an alpha-generating strategy by classifying acquisitions based on the pre-acquisition EVA style quadrant of the acquirers. Over a recent ten-year period, the announcement evidence suggests that acquisitions across all style quadrants generate negative risk-adjusted returns: wherein the magnitude of economic gains from shorting acquirers is determined by EVA style characteristics; namely wealth creators or wealth destroyers. Moreover, we find that the potential for longing gains on targets of acquiring firms is also captured by EVA style.
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Active Investing in Strategic Acquirers
Using an EVA Style Analysis
During the 1990s and beyond, large U.S. industrial firms have deployed substantial capital resources in pursuit of strategic acquisitions. The aggregate average result of these acquisitions is that they destroy shareholder value for the owners of the acquiring firms. There is however, substantial cross-sectional variation in the announcement period returns of these acquiring firms. That being said, active investors (such as hedge funds 1 and other long-short investors) may be able to develop or fine tune alpha-generating investment strategies if they can distinguish "good" bidders (perhaps more aptly, less bad bidders) from "bad" bidders in strategic acquisitions.
In this paper we present a framework for classifying acquiring firms into wealth creators and wealth destroyers. We employ the EVA style analysis developed by Abate, Grant, and Stewart [2004] to classify all large acquirers completing acquisitions over the 1990-1999 period into one of four style quadrants based on their pre-acquisition style. We then examine the wealth effects that these firms experience upon acquisition announcement and analyze these wealth effects by style category. We find that the wealth effects vary by EVA style and event window,
suggesting that investors will benefit to varying degrees from a policy of shorting all style categories of acquiring firms.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we review the literature on acquisition wealth effects and EVA style analysis. Section 3 describes the data and method employed. Section 4 presents the empirical results for strategic acquirers (and their targets).
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Section 5 examines the potential shorting (and longing) implications for active-minded investors around acquisition announcements. Section 6 discusses related EVA findings, while Section 7 summarizes and concludes the paper.
Returns Around Acquisitions and the EVA Style of Investing
Literature Review
It is well-established in the finance literature that acquiring firm shareholders, on average, gain little if any benefit from acquisitions, and often loose value. Target firm shareholders consistently gain value around acquisitions. These results are fairly consistent over time even though the motives for past waves of acquisition activity have varied. For example, acquisitions in the 1960s and 1970s were often motivated by the desire to diversify risk. In the 1980s, a large wave of acquisition activity was driven by the desire to eliminate inefficient diversification and create more focused companies. In the 1990s, a large wave of acquisitions was driven by more strategic considerations. These acquisitions were motivated by a search for strategic business combinations that would potentially produce scale and scope economies, international expansion, and operating efficiencies. Brunner [2002] provides a comprehensive review of the acquisition literature, supporting low and negative returns to acquiring firms across these waves of acquisitions.
A study of large strategic acquirers making acquisitions in the late 1990s by KPMG, finds that 53 percent of these firms complete failed acquisitions when looking at performance one year after the acquisitions. Moller, Schlingemann, and Stulz [2004, 2005] find that large acquirers tend to make value reducing acquisitions and that these firms in aggregate have destroyed value. They report that acquiring-firm shareholders lost 12 cents around acquisition 3 announcements per dollar spent, for a total loss of $240 billion from 1998 to 2001, compared to a $7 billion total loss for the 1980s. Large acquisitions were generally responsible for these losses.
While a number of possible explanations have been offered for why large acquirers continue to make value reducing acquisitions, the puzzle remains. Jensen [1986] , in his freecash flow hypothesis, argues that managers with free cash flow prefer to increase firm size through acquisitions rather than pay cash flow to shareholders. Roll [1986] argues that hubris may account for the value destruction, as overconfident bidders overpay for acquisitions in anticipation of overly optimistic synergistic benefits. Travlos [1987] finds that acquirers paying with equity lose more value than those financing acquisitions with cash. Lang, Stulz, and Walking [1989] and Servaes [1991] find higher target, bidder, and total returns around acquisitions when bidders have high-q ratios and targets have low-q ratios. Lang, Stulz, and Walkling [1991] find that bidder returns are negatively related to cash flow for low-q bidders but not for high-q bidders. McCardle and Visswanathan [1994] and Jovanovic and Braguinsky [2002] argue that firms make acquisitions when they have run out of internal growth opportunities. Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, and Teoh [2002] find that acquirers with higher valuations have lower announcement period returns. Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz [2004] provide a more detailed review of this literature.
Overall, the literature studying the wealth effects of acquisitions reports that acquiring firm shareholders do not earn positive returns. These results are robust over merger waves motivated by different factors, including the most recent wave of acquisitions that was largely motivated by strategic buyers. There is however substantial cross-sectional variation in the returns to acquiring firms and it is possible that these firms are comprised of good bidders and bad bidders, yielding different wealth effects. Investors (such as hedge funds) interested in 4 discerning the value created by good bidders and avoiding, or raising funds by shorting, bad bidders will be interested in analysis to distinguish good (or as we quipped, less bad bidders) from bad bidders.
EVA Style of Investing
Economic value added (EVA) is a metric that measures the fundamental ability (or lack thereof) of a firm to create shareholder value. EVA is a residual income measure that is positive if a company earns more than the cost of capital on its invested capital. Stewart [1991] and Grant [2003] provide a thorough description of EVA. A positive change in EVA results when the return on invested capital exceeds (is less than) the cost of capital and investment is positive (negative). Also, a negative change in EVA results when the return on invested capital is less than (greater than) the cost of capital and investment is positive (negative). Along these lines, firms may be classified into one of four EVA style quadrants. Wealth creators, firms with positive changes in EVA, will exhibit either a return on capital exceeding the cost of capital and positive investment, or a return on capital below the cost of capital and negative investment.
Wealth destroyers, firms with negative changes in EVA, will exhibit either a return on capital less than the cost of capital and positive investment, or a return on capital exceeding the cost of capital and negative investment. Abate, Grant, and Stewart [2004] , refer to this framework as an EVA style of investing. It is also described more fully in the Method section below.
We apply the EVA style analysis to examine three questions (shown below) related to strategic acquisitions by large acquirers. With these questions, we examine whether the type of value creation or destruction, i.e., return on capital relative to cost of capital and investment being positive or negative, are related to acquisition wealth effects, and whether or not the return differences have implications for active-minded investors.
Data and Methods
Data
We obtain data from the Grant, and Stewart [2004] find that 80% of wealth creating firms have jointly positive MVA-and EVA-to-capital ratios, suggesting that a firm's current EVA makes a contribution to its market value. They also find that 92% of wealth destroying firms have jointly negative MVA-and EVA-to-capital ratios, again suggesting a relation between current EVA and market value. Thus, EVA can be taken as reasonable proxy for wealth creation.
EVA can be calculated as a firm's net operating profit after-tax (NOPAT) minus its invested capital (IC) times its weighted average cost of capital (WACC), or:
Rearranging, Equation 1 can be expressed as:
and denoting NOPAT/IC as the return on invested capital (ROIC) as:
Note that ROIC -WACC shows the relation between return on capital and the cost of capital, or the EVA spread. Recognizing that the change in invested capital over a time period is a firm's investment for that period, the change in EVA due to investment (assuming spread constancy) may be expressed as:
EVA is positive (negative) when a firm's return on invested capital exceeds (is less than) its cost of capital, i.e., when the EVA spread is positive (negative). Firms with positive EVA spreads create (destroy) value when they have positive (negative) investment. In turn, firms with negative EVA spreads create (destroy) value when they have negative (positive) investment characteristics.
Using this framework, we classify acquiring firms into four quadrants based on their EVA style characteristics; following the methodology in Abate, Grant, and Stewart [2004] . We examine stock price reaction to the announcement of acquisitions using the Brown and Warner [1985] standard event-study method to compute the daily excess returns. We use a two-step procedure to compute the average daily abnormal returns with stock price data from CRSP. We report our results from using both the CRSP equal-weighted and value-weighted indexes as market proxies.
First, we estimate the parameters of a single-factor market model for each firm. We use the returns from day -255 to day -46 to estimate each firm's alpha and beta coefficients.
Second, we compute the excess return by subtracting a firm's expected daily return from its actual return. We calculate the cumulative abnormal returns by summing the abnormal returns over the periods from day -1 to day 1, day -1 to 30, and day 1 to 30, where day 0 represents announcement of the acquisition. These abnormal returns are estimated for both the acquiring firms and for the corresponding target firms. They are estimated in total, and for each of the four EVA style quadrants of the acquiring firms.
Results
Overall Event Study Results
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Exhibit 3 reports the overall event study results. The abnormal returns for the acquiring firms are negative and statistically significant for all three event windows. The returns are - [1991] in that the Value-Creating-Growth firms, likely to be high MVA and high q, create the most value.
Implications for Active Investors
Shorting (and longing) Opportunities
We now turn to the active investing implications of our stock market findings on large strategic acquirers and their targets. We begin with the acquirers. Since the cumulative abnormal returns in Exhibit 5 across all event windows and EVA styles are negative, this pervasive value destruction finding suggests that it is best for active investors to short them all. In economic terms, the shorting opportunity across strategic acquirers varies in magnitude by EVA style; 13 reinforcing our contention that style classifications matter not only for shareholders when assessing the magnitude of value destruction in acquiring firms, but also for active investors (notably, event-driven hedge funds) seeking profitable trading opportunities around the announcement of corporate acquisitions.
As shown in Exhibit 7, the EVA style analysis reveals that shorting opportunities are the Specifically, longing opportunities on target firms are available across the four EVA style categories. This is particularly the case for the targets of (1) Value-Creating Growth acquirers;
where the potential for significant value creation goes directly to target firm shareholders, and (2) the targets of Under-Investing acquirers; where, due to limited-to-declining organic growth opportunities these firms are forced to diversify or "pay up" in a misguided attempt to recapture the growth glory days. 4 Although the reasons may differ as to why firms become acquirers, the CAR results show economic gains to target firm shareholders and active-minded investors who distinguish targets by EVA style.
Related EVA Results
We have also investigated post-announcement EVA happenings to explain the negative returns to large strategic acquirers. Our regressions (not shown) indicate that returns on invested capital and EVA spreads decline subsequent to acquisitions for most EVA styles. Exhibit 11 captures the negative EVA spread changes for Under-Investing, Value-Creating Growth, and
Value-Destroying Growth acquirers; whereby EVA spreads for these acquirers decline by -1.09%, -4.31%, and -1.49% respectively in the year following an acquisition. At -4.31%, the post-announcement decline in EVA spread is especially poignant for the Value-Creating Growth acquirers. If correct, this suggests that firms with higher levels of pre-acquisition EVA lose more economic profit than low-EVA firms when they engage in acquisitions; perhaps, in a perverse view, because they can better "afford" to.
In contrast, the EVA spread changes for Positive Restructuring acquirers are reflective of an interesting empirical anomaly. As shown in Exhibit 11, we find that the EVA spread of Positive Restructuring firms actually increases (by 85 basis points on average) in the year following an acquisition. Moreover, Exhibit 12 shows that some 60% of Positive Restructuring firms increased their EVA spread in the year following an acquisition, while the spread improvement is only about 25% for Under-Investing and Value-Creating Growth acquirers.
Although the Positive Restructuring firms are apparently moving in the right direction-with positive economic profit momentum-the large negative abnormal returns observed in our study for this EVA style reinforce an earlier contention by Grant [1996 Grant [ , 2003 . He argues that risky troubled companies face an "abundance" of adverse managerial noise such that their positive restructuring efforts falls on investors deaf ears.
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Summary and Conclusion
While numerous prior studies have examined returns to acquiring firm shareholders upon the announcement of acquisitions, including the recent wave of strategic acquisitions, the negative wealth effects to these firms remains a puzzle. As with others, we are left with the more fundamental question of why do corporate bidders (strategic or otherwise) become "bidders" in the first place? That being asked, our study suggests that active investors (hedge funds and other long-short investors) seeking to develop alpha-generating investing strategies from shorting acquiring firms (and longing target firms) can benefit from methods that distinguish wealthcreating from wealth-destroying firms. We employ the EVA style analysis developed by Abate, Grant, and Stewart [2004] to classify acquirers into one of four style categories based on the sources of pre-acquisition wealth creation or destruction. We then examine the wealth effects to 16 large strategic acquirers, seeking to distinguish "good" (now aptly less bad acquirers) from "bad" acquirers based on these pre-acquisition style classifications.
Our event study and EVA style results are consistent with the literature in that while pursuing returns from strategic acquisitions, active-minded investors should consider shorting them all. Our contribution shows that shorting opportunities for investors vary in magnitude by EVA style; reinforcing our contention that style classifications matter not only for shareholders when assessing the magnitude of value destruction in acquiring firms but also for active investors seeking profitable trading opportunities around the announcement of corporate acquisitions.
Moreover, we find that the economic potential for longing opportunities in targets of strategic acquirers is also captured by EVA style characteristics of wealth creator and wealth destroyer acquirers.
Regarding the three questions that we raised at the outset, the joining of EVA style analysis with the more traditional event study analysis leads us to say "no" to the first question, while answering the second and third questions in the affirmative. We find that 1) wealth creating firms (prior positive EVA) do not create value through strategic acquisitions; although they appear to destroy the least amount of shareholder value, 2) wealth destroying firms (prior negative EVA) destroy value via corporate acquisitions; although a stock market anomaly seems present in the pricing of restructuring acquirers that are trying to turn a negative EVA situation around, and 3) varying degrees of shorting (and longing) opportunities on large strategic acquirers (and targets) are potentially economically available to active investors using the EVA style of analysis.
Exhibit 1-EVA Style Quadrants
Description of EVA investment styles following the method of Abate, Grant, and Stewart [2004] . 
